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Some Historic Court Cases In American History |
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| HISTORIC COURT CASE
"These and many other matters which might be noticed, add a volume of unofficial declarations to the mass of organic utterances that this is a Christian nation." SYNOPSIS In error to the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of New
York. Reversed. The word "labor" as used in the alien labor contract law, 23 Stat.
332, prohibiting the importation of foreigners under contract to perform labor, etc.,
means manual labor as distinguished from that of a professional man, as a clergyman. Although the alien contract labor law, 23 Stat. 332, prohibits the importation
of "any" foreigners under contract to perform "labor or service of any
kind," yet it does not apply to one who comes to this country under contract to enter
the service of a church as its rector. It is within the power of courts to declare that a thing which is within the
letter of a statute is not governed by the statute, because not within its spirit or the
intention of its makers. In the construction of a statute, both the title and preamble may be considered
in doubtful cases. Where doubt exists as to meaning of a statute, the title may be looked to for
aid in its construction. It being historically true that the American people are a religious people, as
shown by the religious objects expressed by the original grants and charters of the
colonies, and the recognition of religion in the most solemn acts of their history, as
well as in the constitutions of the states and the nation, the courts, in construing
statutes should not impute to any legislature a purpose of action against religion. In construing a doubtful statute the court will consider the evil which it was
designed to remedy, and for this purpose will look into contemporaneous events, including
the situation as it existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention of the legislative
body, while the act was under consideration. COUNSEL [*511] [143 U.S. 457,
457] Seaman Miller, for plaintiff in error. Asst. Atty. Gen. Maury, for the United States. Mr. Justice BREWER delivered the opinion of the court. Plaintiff in error is a corporation duly organized and incorporated as a religious
society under the laws of the state of New York. E. Walpole Warren was, prior to
September, [143 U.S. 457, 458] 1887, an alien
residing in England. In that month the plaintiff in error made a contract with him, by
which he was to remove to the city of New York, and enter into its service as rector and
pastor; and, in pursuance of such contract, Warren did so remove and enter upon such
service. It is claimed by the United States that this contract on the part of the
plaintiff in error was forbidden by chapter 164, 23 St. p. 332; and an action was
commenced to recover the penalty prescribed by that act. The circuit court held that the
contract was within the prohibition of the statute, and rendered judgment accordingly, (36
Fed. Rep. 303,) and the single question presented for our determination is whether it
erred in that conclusion. The first section describes the act forbidden, and is in these words: 'Be it enacted by the senate and house of representatives of the United States of
America, in congress assembled, that from and after the passage of this act it shall be
unlawful for any person, company, partnership, or corporation, in any manner whatsoever,
to prepay the transportation, or in any way assist or encourage the importation or
migration, of any alien or aliens, any foreigner or foreigners, into the United States,
its territories, or the District of Columbia, under contract or agreement, parol or
special, express or implied, made previous to the inportation or migration of such alien
or aliens, foreigner or foreigners, to perform labor or service of any kind in the United
States, its territories, or the District of Columbia.' It must be conceded that the act of the corporation is within the
letter of this section, for the relation of rector to his church is one of service, and
implies labor on the one side with compensation on the other. Not only are the general
words 'labor' and 'service' both used, but also, as it [*512]
were to guard against any narrow interpretation and emphasize a breadth of meaning,
to them is added 'of any kind;' and, further, as noticed by the circuit judge in his
opinion, the fifth section, which makes specific exceptions, among them professional
actors, artists, lecturers, singers, and domestic [143 U.S.
457, 459] servants, strengthens the idea that every other kind of labor and
service was intended to be reached by the first section. While there is great force to
this reasoning, we cannot think congress intended to denounce with penalties a transaction like that in the present case. It is
a familiar rule that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within
the statute, because not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers. This
has been often asserted, and the Reports are full of cases illustrating its application.
This is not the substitution of the will of the judge for that of the legislator; for
frequently words of general meaning are used in a statute, words broad enough to include
an act in question, and yet a consideration of the whole legislation, or of the
circumstances surrounding its enactment, or of the absurd results which follow from giving
such broad meaning to the words, makes it unreasonable to believe that the legislator
intended to include the particular act. As said in Stradling v. Morgan, Plow. 205: 'From
which cases it appears that the sages of the law heretofore have construed statutes quite
contrary to the letter in some appearance, and those statutes which comprehend all things
in the letter they have expounded to extend to but some things, and those which generally
prohibit all people from doing such an act they have interpreted to permit some people to
do it, and those which include every person in the letter they have adjudged to reach to
some persons only, which expositions have always been founded upon the intent of the
legislature, which they have collected sometimes by considering the cause and necessity of
making the act, sometimes by comparing one part of the act with another, and sometimes by
foreign circumstances.' In Pier Co. v. Hannam, 3 Barn. & Ald. 266, ABBOTT, C. J., quotes from Lord Coke as
follows: 'Acts of parliament are to be so construed as no man that is innocent or free
from injury or wrong be, by a literal construction, punished or endangered.' In the case
of State v. Clark, 29 N. J. Law, 96, 99, it appeared that an act had been passed, making
it a misdemeanor to willfully break down a fence in the possession of another person.
Clark was indicted [143 U.S. 457, 460] under
that statute. The defense was that the act of breaking down the fence, though willful, was
in the exercise of a legal right to go upon his own lands. The trial court rejected the
testimony offered to sustain the defense, and the supreme court held that this ruling was
error. In its opinion the court used this language: 'The act of 1855, in terms, makes the
willful opening, breaking down, or injuring of any fences belonging to or in the
possession of any other person a misdemeanor. In what sense is the term 'willful' used? In
common parlance, 'willful' is used in the sense of 'intentional,' as distinguished from
'accidental' or 'involuntary.' Whatever one does intentionally, he does willfully. Is it
used in that sense in this act? Did the legislature intend to make the intentional opening
of a fence for the purpose of going upon the land of another indictable, if done by
permission or for a lawful purpose? * * * We cannot suppose such to have been the actual
intent. To adopt such a construction would put a stop to the ordinary business of life.
The language of the act, if construed literally, evidently leads to an absurd result. If a
literal construction of the words of a statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as
to avoid the absurdity. The court must restrain the words. The object designed to be
reached by the act must limit and control the literal import of the terms and phrases
employed.' In U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 486, the defendants were indicted for the
violation of an act of congress providing 'that if any person shall knowingly and
willfully obstruct or retard the passage of the mail, or of any driver or carrier, or of
any horse or carriage carrying the same, he shall, upon conviction, for every such
offense, pay a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars.' The specific charge was that the
defendants knowingly and willfully retarded the passage of one Farris, a carrier of the
mail, while engaged in the performance of his duty, and also in like manner retarded the
steam-boat Gen. Buell, at that time engaged in carrying the mail. To this indictment the
defendants pleaded specially that Farris had been indicted for murder by a court of
competent authority in Kentucky; that a bench-warrant had been issued and [143 U.S. 457, 461] placed in the hands of the
defendant Kirby, the sheriff of the county, commanding him to arrest Farris, and bring him
before the court to answer to the indictment; and that, in obedience to this warrant, he
and the other defendants, as his posse, entered upon the steamboat Gen. Buell and arrested
Farris, and used only such force as was necessary to accomplish that arrest. The question
as to the sufficiency of this plea was certified to this court, and it was held that the
arrest of Farris upon the warrant from the state court was not an obstruction of the mail,
or the retarding of the passage of a carrier of the mail, within the meaning of the act.
In its opinion the court says: 'All laws should receive a sensible construction. General
terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression,
or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature
intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this character. The
reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter. The common sense of man
approves the judgment mentioned by Puffendorf, that the Bolognian law which enacted 'that
whoever drew blood in the streets should be punished with the utmost severity,' did not
extend to the surgeon who opened the vein of a person that fell down in the street in a
fit. The same [*513] common sense accepts the
ruling, cited by Plowden, that the statute of 1 Edw. II., which enacts that a prisoner who
breaks prison shall be guilty of felony, does not extend to a prisoner who breaks out when
the prison is on fire, 'for he is not to be hanged because he would not stay to be burnt.'
And we think that a like common sense will sanction the ruling we make, that the act of
congress which punishes the obstruction or retarding of the passage of the mail, or of its
carrier, does not apply to a case of temporary detention of the mail caused by the arrest
of the carrier upon an indictment for murder.' The following cases may also be cited:
Henry v. Tilson, 17 Vt. 479; Ryegate v. Wardsboro, 30 Vt. 743; Ex parte Ellis, 11 Cal.
220; Ingraham v. Speed, 30 Miss. 410; Jackson v. Collins, 3 Cow. 89; People v. Insurance
Co., 15 Johns. 358; Burch v. Newbury, 10 N. Y. 374; People v. [143
U.S. 457, 462] Commissioners, 95 N. Y. 554, 558; People v. Lacombe, 99 N.
Y. 43, 49, 1 N. E. Rep. 599; Chesapeake & Ohio Canal Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.
Co., 4 Gill & J. 152; Osgood v. Breed, 12 Mass. 525, 530; Wilbur v. Crane, 13 Pick.
284; Oates v. Bank, 100 U. S. 239. Among other things which may be considered in determining the intent
of the legislature is the title of the act. We do not mean that it may be
used to add to or take from the body of the statute, (Hadden v. Collector, 5 Wall. 107,)
but it may help to interpret its meaning. In the case of U. S. v. Fisher, 2 Cranch, 358,
386, Chief Justice MARSHALL said: 'On the infiuence which the title ought to have in
construing the enacting clauses, much has been said, and yet it is not easy to discern the
point of difference between the opposing counsel in this respect. Neither party contends
that the title of an act can control plain words in the body of the statute; and neither
denies that, taken with other parts, it may assist in removing ambiguities. Where the
intent is plain, nothing is left to construction. Where the mind labors to discover the
design of the legislature, it seizes everything from which aid can be derived; and in such
case the title claims a degree of notice, and will have its due share of consideration.'
And in the case of U. S. v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. 610, 631, the same judge applied the doctrine
in this way: 'The words of the section are in terms of unlimited extent. The words 'any
person or persons' are broad enough to comprehend every human being. But general words
must not only be limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the state, but also to those
objects to which the legislature intended to apply them. Did the legislature intend to
apply these words to the subjects of a foreign power, who in a foreign ship may commit
murder or robbery on the high seas? The title of an act cannot control its words, but may
furnish some aid in showing what was in the mind of the legislature. The title of this act
is, 'An act for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States.' It would seem
that offenses against the United States, not offenses against the human race, were the
crimes which the legislature intended by this law to punish.' [143 U.S. 457, 463] Again, another guide to the meaning of a statute is found in the evil
which it is designed to remedy; and for this the court properly looks at contemporaneous
events, the situation as it existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention of the
legislative body. U. S. v. Railroad Co., 91 U. S. 72, 79. The situation which called for
this statute was briefly but fully stated by Mr. Justice BROWN when, as district judge, he
decided the case of U. S. v. Craig, 28 Fed. Rep. 795, 798: 'The motives and history of the
act are matters of common knowledge. It had become the practice for large capitalists in
this country to contract with their agents abroad for the shipment of great numbers of an
ignorant and servile class of foreign laborers, under contracts by which the employer
agreed, upon the one hand, to prepay their passage, while, upon the other hand, the
laborers agreed to work after their arrival for a certain time at a low rate of wages. The
effect of this was to break down the labor market, and to reduce other laborers engaged in
like occupations to the level [143 U.S. 457, 464] of
the assisted immigrant. The evil finally became so flagrant that an appeal was made to
congress for relief by the passage of the act in question, the design of which was to
raise the standard of foreign immigrants, and to discountenance the migration of those who
had not sufficient means in their own hands, or those of their friends, to pay their
passage.' It appears, also, from the petitions, and in the testimony presented before the
committees of congress, that it was this cheap, unskilled labor which was making the
trouble, and the influx of which congress sought to prevent. It was never suggested that
we had in this country a surplus of brain toilers, and, least of all, that the market for
the services of Christian ministers was depressed by foreign competition. Those were
matters to which the attention of congress, or of the people, was not directed. So far,
then, as the evil which [*514] was sought to
be remedied interprets the statute, it also guides to an exclusion of this contract from
the penalties of the act. A singular circumstance, throwing light upon the intent of congress, is found in this
extract from the report of the senate committee on education and labor, recommending the
passage of the bill: 'The general facts and considerations which induce the committee to
recommend the passage of this bill are set forth in the report of the committee of the
house. The committee report the bill back without amendment, although there are certain
features thereof which might well be changed or modified, in the hope that the bill may
not fail of passage during the present session. Especially would the committee have
otherwise recommended amendments, substituting for the expression, 'labor and service,'
whenever it occurs in the body of the bill, the words 'manual labor' or 'manual service,'
as sufficiently broad to accomplish the purposes of the bill, and that such amendments
would remove objections which a sharp and perhaps unfriendly criticism may urge to the
proposed legislation. The committee, however, believing that the bill in its present form
will be construed as including only those whose labor or service is manual in character,
and being very desirous that the bill become a law before the adlournment, have reported
the bill without [143 U.S. 457, 465] change.'
Page 6059, Congressional Record, 48th Cong. And, referring back to the report of the
committee of the house, there appears this language: 'It seeks to restrain and prohibit
the immigration or importation of laborers who would have never seen our shores but for
the inducements and allurements of men whose only object is to obtain labor at the lowest
possible rate, regardless of the social and material well-being of our own citizens, and
regardless of the evil consequences which result to American laborers from such
immigration. This class of immigrants care nothing about our institutions, and in many
instances never even heard of them. They are men whose passage is paid by the importers.
They come here under contract to labor for a certain number of years. They are ignorant of
our social condition, and, that they may remain so, they are isolated and prevented from
coming into contact with Americans. They are generally from the lowest social stratum, and
live upon the coarsest food, and in hovels of a character before unknown to American
workmen. They, as a rule, do not become citizens, and are certainly not a desirable
acquisition to the body politic. The inevitable tendency of their presence among us is to
degrade American labor, and to reduce it to the level of the imported pauper labor.' Page
5359, Congressional Record, 48th Cong. We find, therefore, that the title of the act, the evil which was intended to be
remedied, the circumstances surrounding the appeal to congress, the reports of the
committee of each house, all concur in affirming that the intent of congress was simply to
stay the influx of this cheap, unskilled labor. But, beyond all these matters, no purpose of action against religion
can be imputed to any legislation, state or national, because this is a religious people.
This is historically true. From the discovery of this continent to the present hour, there
is a single voice making this affirmation. The commission to Christopher Columbus, prior
to his sail westward, is from "Ferdinand and Isabella, by the grace of God, king and
queen of Castile," etc., and recites that "it is hoped that by God's assistance
some of the continents and islands in the [496] ocean will be discovered," etc. The
first colonial grant, that made to Sir Walter Raleigh in 1584, was from "Elizabeth,
by the grace of God, of England, Fraunce, and Ireland, queene, defender of the
faith," etc.; and the grant authorizing him to enact statutes of the government of
the proposed colony provided that "they be not against the true Christian faith nowe
professed in the Church of England." The first charter of Virginia, granted by King
James I. in 1606, after reciting the application of certain parties for a charter,
commenced the grant in these words: "We, greatly commending, and graciously accepting
of, their Desires for the Furtherance of so noble a Work, which may, by the Providence of
Almighty God, hereafter tend to the Glory of His Divine Majesty, in propagating of
Christian Religion to such People, as yet live in Darkness and miserable Ignorance of the
true Knowledge and Worship of God, and may in time bring the Infidels and Savages, living
in those parts, to human Civility, and to a settled and quiet Government; DO, by these our
Letters-Patents, graciously accept of, and agree to, their humble and well-intentioned
Desires." Language of similar import may be found in the subsequent charters of that colony from
the same king, in 1609 and 1611; and the same is true of the various charters granted to
the other colonies. In language more or less emphatic is the establishment of the
Christian religion declared to be one of the purposes of the grant. The celebrated compact
made by the pilgrims in the Mayflower, 1620, recites: "Having undertaken for the
Glory of God, and Advancement of the Christian Faith, and the Honour of our King and
Country, a Voyage to plant the first Colony in the northern Parts of Virginia; Do by these
Presents, solemnly and mutually, in the Presence of God and one another, covenant and
combine ourselves together into a civil Body Politick, for our better Ordering and
Preservation, and Furtherance of the Ends aforesaid." The fundamental orders of Connecticut, under which a provisional government was
instituted in 1638-39, commence with this declaration: "Forasmuch as it hath pleased
the Allmighty God by the wise disposition of his diuyne pruidence [143 U.S. 457, 467] so to order and dispose of things that
we the Inhabitants and Residents of Windsor, Hartford, and Wethersfield are now cohabiting
and dwelling in and vppon the River of Conectecotte and the Lands thereunto adioyneing;
And well knowing where a people are gathered togather the word of {515} God requires that
to mayntayne the peace and union of such a people there should be an orderly and decent
Gouerment established according to God, to order and dispose of the affayres of the people
at all seasons as occation shall require; doe therefore assotiate and conioyne our selues
to be as one Publike State or Commonwelth; and doe, for our selues and our Successors and
such as shall be adioyned to vs att any tyme hereafter, enter into Combination and
Confederation togather, to mayntayne and presearue the liberty and purity of the gospell
of our Lord Jesus wch we now prfesse, as also the disciplyne of the
Churches, wch according to the truth of the said gospell is now practised
amongst vs." In the charter of privileges granted by William Penn to the province of Pennsylvania,
in 1701, it is recited: "Because no People can be truly happy, though under the
greatest Enjoyment of Civil Liberties, if abridged of the Freedom of their Consciences, as
to their Religious Profession and Worship; And Almighty God being the only Lord of
Conscience, Father of Lights and Spirits; and the Author as well as Object of all divine
Knowledge, Faith, and Worship, who only doth enlighten the Minds, and persuade and
convince the Understandings of People, I do hereby grant and declare," etc. Coming nearer to the present time, the declaration of independence recognizes the
presence of the Divine in human affairs in these words: "We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of
Happiness." "We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America,
in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the
rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name and by Authority of the good People of these
Colonies, solemnly publish and declare," etc.; "And for the [143 U.S. 457, 468] support of this Declaration, with a firm
reliance on the Protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our
Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor." If we examine the constitutions of the various states, we find in them a constant
recognition of religious obligations. Every constitution of every one of the 44 states
contains language which, either directly or by clear implication, recognizes a profound
reverence for religion, and an assumption that its influence in all human affairs is
essential to the well-being of the community. This recognition may be in the preamble,
such as is found in the constitution of Illinois, 1870: "We, the people of the state
of Illinois, grateful to Almighty God for the civil, political, and religious liberty
which He hath so long permitted us to enjoy, and looking to Him for a blessing upon our
endeavors to secure and transmit the same unimpaired to succeeding generations," etc.
It may be only in the familiar requisition that all officers shall take an oath closing
with the declaration, "so help me God." It may be in clauses like that of the
constitution of Indiana, 1816, art. 11, §4: "The manner of administering an oath or
affirmation shall be such as is most consistent with the conscience of the deponent, and
shall be esteemed the most solemn appeal to God." Or in provisions such as are found
in articles 36 and 37 of the declaration of the rights of the constitution of Maryland,
(1867): "That, as it is the duty of every man to worship God in such manner as he
thinks most acceptable to Him, all persons are equally entitled to protection in their
religious liberty: wherefore, no person ought, by any law, to be molested in his person or
estate on account of his religious persuasion or profession, or for his religious
practice, unless, under the color of religion, he shall disturb the good order, peace, or
safety of the state, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others in their
natural, civil, or religious rights; nor ought any person to be compelled to frequent or
maintain or contribute, unless on contract, to maintain any place of worship or any
ministry; nor shall any person, otherwise competent, be deemed incompetent as a witness or
juror on account of his religious belief: provided, he [143
U.S. 457, 469] believes in the existence of God, and that, under his
dispensation, such person will be held morally accountable for his acts, and be rewarded
or punished therefor, either in this world or the world to come. That no religious test
ought ever to be required as a qualification for any office or profit or trust in this
state, other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God; nor shall the
legislature prescribe any other oath of office than the oath prescribed by this
constitution." Or like that in articles 2 and 3 of part 1 of the constitution of
Massachusetts, (1780:) "It is the right as well as the duty of all men in society
publicly, and at stated seasons, to worship the Supreme Being, the Great Creator and
Preserver of the universe. * * * As the happiness of a people and the good order and
preservation of civil government essentially depend upon piety, religion, and morality,
and as these cannot be generally diffused through a community but by the institution of
the public worship of God and of public instructions in piety, religion, and morality:
Therefore, to promote their happiness, and to secure the good order and preservation of
their government, the people of this commonwealth have a right to invest their legislature
with power to authorize and require, and the legislature shall, from time to time,
authorize and require, the several towns, parishes, precincts, and other bodies politic or
religious societies to make suitable provision, at their own expense, for the institution
of the public worship of God and for the support and maintenance of public Protestant
teachers of piety, religion and morality, in all cases where such provisions shall not be
made voluntarily." Or, as in sections 5 and 14 of article 7 of the constitution of
Mississippi, (1832:) "No person who denies the being of a God, or a future state of
rewards and punishments, shall hold any office in the civil department of this state. * *
* Religion {516} morality, and knowledge being necessary to good government, the
preservation of liberty, and the happiness of mankind, schools, and the means of
education, shall forever be encouraged in this state." Or by article 22 of the
constitution of Delaware, (1776,) which required all officers, besides an oath of
allegiance, to make and subscribe the following declaration: "I, A.B., do profess [143 U.S. 457, 470] faith in God the Father, and in Jesus
Christ His only Son, and in the Holy Ghost, one God, blessed for evermore; and I do
acknowledge the Holy Scriptures of the Old and New Testament to be given by divine
inspiration." Even the constitution of the United States, which is supposed to have little touch upon
the private life of the individual, contains in the first amendment a declaration common
to the constitutions of all the states, as follows: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,"
etc., - and also provides in article 1, § 7, (a provision common to many constitutions,)
that the executive shall have 10 days (Sundays excepted) within which to determine whether
he will approve or veto a bill. There is no dissonance in these declarations. There is a universal language pervading
them all, having one meaning. They affirm and reaffirm that this is a religious nation.
These are not individual sayings, declarations of private persons. They are organic
utterances. They speak the voice of the entire people. While because of a general
recognition of this truth the question has seldom been presented to the courts, yet we
find that in Updegraph v. Comm., 11 Serg. & R. 394, 400, it was decided that,
"Christianity, general Christianity, is, and always has been, a part of the common
law of Pennsylvania; * * * not Christianity with an established church and tithes and
spiritual courts, but Christianity with liberty of conscience to all men." And in
People v. Ruggles, 8 Johns. 290, 294, 295, Chancellor KENT, the
great commentator on American law, speaking as chief justice of the supreme court of New
York, said: "The people of this state, in common with the people of this country,
profess the general doctrines of Christianity as the rule of their faith and practice; and
to scandalize the author of those doctrines in not only, in a religious point of view,
extremely impious, but, even in respect to the obligations due to society, is a gross
violation of decency and good order. * * * The free, equal, and undisturbed enjoyment of
religious opinion, whatever it may be, and free and decent discussions on any religious [143 U.S. 457, 471] subject, is granted and secured; but to
revile, with malicious and blasphemous contempt, the religion professed by almost the
whole community is an abuse of that right. Nor are we bound by any expressions in the
constitution, as some have strangely supposed, either not to punish at all, or to punish
indiscriminately the like attacks upon the religion of Mahomet or of the Grand Lama; and
for this plain reason that the case assumes that we are a Christian people, and the
morality of the country is deeply ingrafted upon Christianity, and not upon the doctrines
or worship of those impostors." And in the famous case of Vidal v. Girard's Ex'rs, 2
How. 127, 198, this court, while sustaining the will of Mr. Girard, with its provisions
for the creation of a college into which no minister should be permitted to enter,
observed: "it is also said, and truly, that the Christian religion is a part of the
common law of Pennsylvania." If we pass beyond these matters to a view of American life, as expressed by its laws,
its business, its customs, and its society, we find everywhere a clear recognition of the
same truth. Among other matters note the following: The form of oath universally
prevailing, concluding with an appeal to the Almighty; the custom of opening sessions of
all deliberative bodies and most conventions with prayer; the prefatory words of all
wills, "In the name of God, amen;" the laws respecting the observance of the
Sabbath, with the general cessation of all secular business, and the closing of courts,
legislatures, and other similar public assemblies on that day; the churches and church
organizations which abound in every city, town, and hamlet; the multitude of charitable
organizations existing everywhere under Christian auspices; the gigantic missionary
associations, with general support, and aiming to establish Christian missions in every
quarter of the globe. These and many other matters which might be noticed, add a volume of
unofficial declarations to the mass of organic utterances that this
is a Christian nation. In the face of all these, shall it be believed that a
congress of the United States intended to make it a misdemeanor for a church of this
country to contract for the services of a Christian minister residing in another nation? [143 U.S. 457, 472] Suppose, in the congress
that passed this act, some member had offered a bill which in terms declared that, if any
Roman Catholic church in this country should contract with Cardinal Manning to come to
this country, and enter into its service as pastor and priest, or any Episcopal church
should enter into a like contract with Canon Farrar, or any Baptist church should make
similar arrangements with Rev. Mr. Spurgeon, or any Jewish synagogue with some eminent
rabbi, such contract should be adjudged unlawful and void, and the church making it be
subject to prosecution and punishment. Can it be believed that it would have received a
minute of approving thought or a single vote? Yet it is contended that such was, in
effect, the meaning of this statute. The construction invoked cannot be accepted as
correct. It is a case where there was presented a definite evil, in view of which the
legislature used general terms with the purpose of reaching all phases of that evil; and
thereafter, unexpectedly, it is developed that the general language thus employed is broad
enough to reach cases and acts which the whole history and life of the country affirm
could not have been intentionally legislated against. It is the duty of the courts, under
those circumstances, to say that, however {517}
broad the language of the statute may be, the act, although within the letter, is not with
the intention of the legislature, and therefore cannot be within the statute. The judgment will be reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings in
accordance with the opinion. |